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I
INTRODUCTION

Now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States1 is the question
whether the Interstate Commerce Commission exceeded its authority in ordering a
io per cent decrease in railway class freight rates for all interstate shipments throughout the United States east of the Rocky Mountains, except for shipments within the
northeastern area of the United States, and in ordering a io per cent increase in
railway class freight rates for all interstate shipments within the northeastern area
of the United States. The Commission's action was described as an interim measure
pending the bringing about of national uniformity in the classification of freight and
a greater degree of national uniformity throughout the United States in the class
freight rate structures, and was based on findings that these changes were necessary
in order to eliminate unreasonableness and undue discrimination in classifications
and freight rates, in violation of sections I and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act.2
The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission now challenged in the Supreme Court was entered on May 15, 1945, contemporaneously with the filing of an
elaborate i6o,ooo-word report or opinion of the Commission explaining and supporting the orderY
The Commission's decision is generally regarded as its most important and farreaching action in sixty years, and it is no exaggeration to say that it affects virtually
every person in the United States. Although the class rates involved are only a seg*A.B. 1938, Washington and Lee University; LL.B. 1931, Harvard University. Member of law firm
of Cummings, Stanley, Truitt & Cross, Washington, D. C. Formerly Special Assistant to the Attorney
General of the United States, Antitrust Division (1939-1947, except military leave for three years); Special Counsel for Price Administrator and Director of Economic Stabilization in Ex parte 162 (1946);
Assistant Attorney General of Missouri (1933-1939). Contributor to legal periodicals, and collaborator in
preparation of the Winter, X940, issue of LAw AND CoNTEmpoRAPY PROBLEMS (THE SHERmAN ANTsmusr
AcT AND ITs ENFOREM ENT).
' October Term, 1946, The States of New York, Delaware, et a!., Appellants, v. The United States of
America, et al., Appellees, No. 343; The Honorable Horace A. Hildreth, Governor of the State of Maine,
et al., Appellants, v. The United States of America, et a!., Appellees, No. 344; The Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., et al., Appellants, v. The United States of America, et al., Appellees, No. 345; appeals from the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, argued March 3, 4, 5, 1947.
[This paper was prepared before the cases here cited were decided by the Supreme Court. See
New York v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1207 (1947), and the FOREWORD to this symposium. Ed.]
224 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §1 (1940); 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49
U. S. C. §3 (1940).
Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I.C.C. 447 (1945); Supplementary report and order denying
motions to reconsider and reopen, Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 264 I.C.C. 41 (1945).
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ment of all the going railroad 4 freight rates,/they set the pattern for the whole
freight rate structure; they move a substantial amount of the high-quality, highrevenue railroad freight; and without classification and class-rate uniformity there
is no possibility of achieving uniformity for any other freight rates.
The Commission's decision in 1945 resulted from two separate investigations,
instituted on its own motion on July 29, 1939: Docket No. 28310, entitled Consolidated Freight Classification,and Docket No. 28300, entitled Class Rate Investigation,
1939. All the railroads in the United States subject to rate regulation were made
respondents, and a panel of state commissioners sat with the Commission throughout the proceedings.5
The Commission held extensive public hearings in various cities. A record of
over seventeen thousand pages was built up. Almost five hundred lawyers and other
persons appearing in a representative capacity were participants of record in the
proceedings. Pre-hearing conferences started in 194o, hearings were held during
1941, 1942, and 1943, the case was submitted on extensive oral arguments and numerous briefs in x944, and was held under advisement by the Commission for almost
a year.
On November 29, 1945, nine northern states filed their petition in the District
Court for the Northern District of New York to set aside in their entirety the findings and action of the Commission. The governors of the six New England states
intervened on the side of the plaintiffs, as did most of the western railroads, which
later brought a separate suit in the same court seeking the same relief, this suit
being consolidated with the original suit. The Interstate Commerce Commission
intervened on the side of the United States, as did the southern states and a number
of the western states. An interlocutory injunction was issued by the three-judge
court on December 21, 1945; the case was tried on its merits in February, 1946;
and on May 9,1946, the three-judge court filed a unanimous written opinion
adopting all the Commission's findings of fact and upholding the action of the
Commission in all respects." In the final decree, however, entered May 27, 1946, the
District Court stayed the effect of the Commission's order pending decision by
7
the Supreme Court of the United States, so that the new rates are still inoperative.
II
STATUTORY AuTHORiTY OF TE COMMIssION

A. Before 1940
The two investigations instituted by the Commission were inquiries into two
kinds of unlawfulness-unreasonableness and discrimination. The unlawfulness
'Interstate rail-and-water and all-water rates and classifications were also involved in the investigation
orders, but were later eliminated from consideration.
24 SrAT. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §13(3) (1940).
"State of New York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856 (946).
The Government and the other appellees tried unsuccessfully in the Supreme Court, by a separate
appeal, allowed by Mr. Justice Reed on May 31, 1946, to have this stay pending appeal vacated by the
Supreme Court, on the authority of such cases as Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926),
and United States v. Ohio, 291 U. S. 644 (1934). United States v. New York, 328 U. S. 824 (1946).
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which was the subject of the inquiry concerned classifications and also class rates,
each from the standpoint both of unreasonableness and discrimination.
Section i(5)(a) is the major substantive section of the Interstate Commerce Act
dealing with unreasonableness of rates. It provides that "all charges made for any
service rendered .. . shall be just and reasonable," and it prohibits "every unjust
and unreasonable charge."' Section 1(6)9 embodies the same obligations and prohibitions, with respect to classifications, as are imposed by section i(5) (a) in connection with rates. Section i (4)extends these provisions to joint through rates and
classifications.'
Section 3(1) of the Act deals with discrimination. It mentions neither rates nor
classifications, but its language is so broad that it obviously includes both. It prohibits "any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage . ..or ...undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever" to persons, places,
or kinds of traffic." The sweeping character of this prohibition against discrimination-the principal evil aimed at by the original 2Interstate Commerce Act-has been
emphasized by the Supreme Court many times.'
Section 15(1) of the Act gives the Commission the power to fix new rates to
supplant unlawful rates.'3 This section provides that upon a finding by the Commission that classifications or rates, or both, are unlawful under section I or section 3,
or both sections, "the Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable rates, . . .maximum or
minimum, or maximum and minimum, . . . and classification," and it prohibits
noncompliance with the new rates and classifications so prescribed. When the Commission prescribes rates under section 15(1), it is, of course, acting in a legislative
capacity.' 4
The broad power of the Commission before 194o is indicated by United States v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad,in which the Court said:
Under §15 of the statute the Commission of its own motion may conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the rates of all lines within the area of controversy, may fix the fair

relation between one line and another, and may build the structure of the rates accordingly. Floridav. United States, 292 U. S. I; United States v. Louisiana,290 U. S. 70.15
B. The Transportation Act of 194o
In 1940 Congress gave the Commission a clear mandate to deal with interterritorial rate discrimination when it amended section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act so as to prohibit specifically any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any "region, district, or territory";"f and by section 5 (b), known as the Ramspeck
24 STAT. 379 (1887). as amended, 49 U. S. C. §1(5)(a) (1940).
STAT. 379 (z887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §i(6) (1940).
102 4 STAT. 379 (x887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §1(4) (1940).
R

o24

380 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. A. §3(1) (Supp. 1946).
(1931).
13 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §15(1) (940).
" Terminal R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U. S. 17 (1924).
16 294 U. S.499, 509 (1935).
1c 24 STAT. 380 (x887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §3(1) (1940).
',24 STAT.
12

See Louisville &N. R.R. v. United States, 282 U. S.740
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Resolution, Congress directed the Commission to institute an investigation of the
interterritorial and intraterritorial rates and to remove any unlawful discrimination
17
found to exist between territories.
Until 1935 section 3(1) specified only "person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, or particular description of traffic" as objects of prohibited discrimination. The only word in that series that refers to a geographical unit is "locality."
The word "locality" was held not broad enough to include a port district in Texas
& PacificRailway Company v. United States,"8 and therefore in 1935 Congress added

to this series the following items: "port, port district, gateway, transit point."
These words, especially after the Texas & Pacific case, seemed not broad enough
to cover territories as a whole, a designation which, of course, by 1940 was well
recognized as a term of art in the railroad regulation field. The legislative history
of the 194o amendment of section 3(i), which added to the series "region, district, or

territory," shows quite clearly that Congress was aware of the limited application of
the earlier language and sought to remove this limitation' 0
The appellants' principal argument in the District Court and in the Supreme
Court in the Class Rate case has been that the Commission made a mistake of law
in treating the 1940 legislation as a Congressional mandate requiring the Commission to bring about absolute national uniformity in freight rates. The contention is
that the Commission is repeating the mistake it made twenty years ago in interpreting the Hoch-Smith Resolution ° as a mandate to treat agricultural products as
a most favored class, regardless of existing standards of rate making-an erroneous
conception which the Supreme Court repudiated in upsetting the Commission's
decision.2 ' The fallacy in this argument is that the Commission did not treat the
194o legislation as a mandate to bring about national rate uniformity regardless of
differences in territorial conditions, but only as a mandate to investigate territorial
conditions, and to eliminate territorial rate differences to the extent that they were
found to be unjustified by differences in territorial conditions. Whether the X940
amendment to section 3(I) made a change in substantive law by prohibiting discrimination against territories which was not unlawful before, as the lower court
held, or whether the 194o amendment was merely declaratory, there can be no question about the power of the Commission in 1945 to remove territorial discriminations
found to exist. The Commission understood this, and undertook only to remove
discriminations which it found to exist. The very point of its whole proceeding
was to find out whether existing rate differentials were or were not justified by
differences in territorial conditions.
Section 3(I) of the Interstate Commerce Act has always been an unequivocal,
although qualified, mandate for rate uniformity. The very thing Congress sought
13724 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C., note following §3 (1940).
18 289 U. S. 627 (1933).
10 84 CONG. REC. 5889, 9705 (1939).
2o43 STAT. 8o (1925).

'1Ann Arbor R.R. v.United States, 281 U. S.658 (1930).
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to achieve by section 3(I), starting in 1887, was equality of rates. Railroads were
required by the original section 3(1) to charge equal rates to all persons, and were
prohibited from charging them different rates in the absence (and of course, this
is the necessary qualification) of different circumstances requiring that they be
given different treatment. If two persons under equal circumstances were shipping
the same kind of freight from one point to another, they had to be treated equally.
Of course, if the freight were of a different kind, or if the mileage or points of
origin or destination were different, these or other differences might warrant a rate
differentiation; but in the absence of substantial differences of circumstances, the
essential mandate of section 3(1) will control.
Whereas section 3(I) in its inception had been a mandate to the Commission to
equalize rates as between persons, it became, in 194o, a mandate to equalize rates
between regions and territories, subject to the same inherent qualification-a mandate to bring about equality of rates, not regardless of surrounding circumstances,
but unless surrounding circumstances require rate differentiations. Before the investigation in the Class Rate case there had never been any effort by the Commission
to inquire into the question whether the admitted large differences in class rates
between territories were or were not justified or required by comparable territorial
differences in costs and other transportation conditions. Neither the Commission nor
the Congress, nor anyone else, knew to what extent, if any, these rate differentials
were required or justified by different conditions in the several rate territories. However, it was generally believed, as the debates in Congress show, that it would probably
be found that at least some of the differences were not justified, or were not justified
to the extent of the rate differences 2 2 It was this situation which the Commission
recognized as requiring it to bring about "a greater degree" of equalization and

uniformity.
III
THE RATE SITUATION FOUND By THE CoMIssIoN TO EXIsT IN 1945
The existing system of making railroad freight rates has been discussed in detail
in other articles in this publication. However, the rate-making situation as the Com-

mission analyzed it in the Class Rate case is so closely related to the relief which the
Commission decided to order that an explanation of the phases of the rate structures
emphasized by the Commission in its report seems appropriate and necessary here.
A. Classifications
report is given over to an analysis of the
section
of
the
Commission's
The first
existing classifications. The Commission considered classification to be the foundation or cornerstone of rate making, because rate relationships have no meaning unless
they are tied to stable and properly related classification ratings. The class-rate scales
" 84 CoNG. REc. 5889-589o, 6071-6072, 9705 (1939); 86 CoNc. REC. 5553 (1940)23 262 I.C.C. 447, 692 (1945). The Commission's report will be searched in vain for any indication
that it considered itself required, as appellants insist it considered itself required, to bring about national
rate uniformity regardless of territorial differences in transportation conditions.
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are entirely in terms of class i or first-class ratings. Since all other classification
ratings are in terms of percentages of the first-class rates, the actual cost of shipment
is just as much affected by the classification rating assigned to a commodity as it is
by the level of the first-class rate scale. The Commission's report shows why the
Commission instituted not only a class-rate investigation but also a classification
investigation, and immediately consolidated the two: because, as a practical matter,
class rates cannot be dealt with apart from classifications. As the Commission stated,
"A rating must be complemented by a class rate, and vice versa, in order to give sub24
stance to either."
In the early days of railroads, classification of freight was patterned after that
used for transportation by boats and wagons and did not follow any definite standards, each road having its own practice. Usually, only a small variety of traffic moved
on any one short railroad, which might use only a few simple classes, such as light
goods, heavy goods, case goods, logs, and whiskey-a far cry from the modern freight
classification containing over 20,000 ratings.
As railroads developed and grew, classification systems became more complex,
but not much more unified. For example, at one time in the Middle Atlantic states
and West Virginia alone (eastern trunk-line territory) there were 138 different freight
classification systems. With increasing interchange of traffic between railroads, a
number of different classifications were in effect on a single railroad: one for local
traffic, another for joint traffic in one direction, another for joint traffic in the opposite
direction, and others applying to traffic moving to or from particular sections of the
country. Such complexity was, naturally, a source of great confusion and uncertainty
to shippers 5 The need for a more nearly uniform classification was acute when the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 came into being and required that all classifications
be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
Just before the Interstate Commerce Act became effective, the carriers in official
territory, 26 faced with classification systems within their territory at least as chaotic
and complicated as the Commission was faced with in 1939 in the nation as a whole,
cleaned up and unified the official-territory classification by only eleven days' work,
consolidating all the many classification systems in that territory into one new one,
which became effective with the Act on April i, i887.
Since Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission were and are dealing
with a national economy rather than a regional economy, it was naturally to be
expected that under the direction of the Commission national classification uniformity
would quickly follow the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, especially after the experience of the eastern carriers in their quick cleaning up of the
classifications in their territory. However, although the Commission has constantly
2A262 I.C.C. 447, 473 (1945)-

" Suspension of Western Classification, 25 I.C.C. 442 (1912).
" Roughly, the area of the United States north of the Potomac and Ohio rivers, and east of the
Mississippi River.
2T I.C.C. ANN. REP. 36-37 (x888).
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emphasized the necessity of national classification uniformity, the differences between
the classifications of the East, South, and West are almost as fundamental and varied
as they were in i887, and the Commission had never undertaken to tackle the problem of national classification uniformity until 1939.
The Commission, prior to 1939, had brought about classification uniformity within
the separate regions, step by step, but had not tried to deal with the problem of the
relationship between regions. These region-by-region adjustments, which, like the
national investigation, dealt with both classifications and class rates in the same proceedings, were accomplished during the 192o's and early x93o's0 8
In the Consolidated Southwestern Cases the Commission made this rather plaintve progress report:
For years we have endeavored to promote uniformity in classification.

Except for

unification of rules and commodity descriptions, the progress in that direction has not
been encouraging ....
So long as vital differences in classification exist it is impossible
to.bring about uniform class percentages throughout the country, but, on the other hand,
until the class percentages are made more nearly uniform, progress toward uniform classi-

fication is impeded 29

In 1939 there were three major classifications, just as there had been in 1887. The
differences between them, and their relationship to each other, are illustrated in the
following table (which also includes the separate Illinois classification, a further
complication):
TABLE i3°
REGULAR CLASS DESiGNATIoN
WESTERN

Percent of Class 100

100 .................
85..................
70 ..................

Official

1
2
3

Illinois

1
2
3

60 ..................

55 .................
,50.................
45..................
40 ..................

. 4
...
...

...

20 ..................
.17 2 ................

11-26
4
...

A
...
0

4
...
5
6

MountainPacific
Territory

1
2
3

1
2
3
4

...
...
...

4
5,A
i
...

5

...

7

B

8

27 .2
............... .
6
25 ...............
...
22Y ...............

1
2
3

Western
Trunk-Line and
Southwestern
Territories

...

.i-26

37Y2 .............
..
35 ..................
5
32 2 ...............
30 ..................

Southern

6,C
.....
D
E
...

C

9
10
11
12

E
...

a Southern Class Rate Investigation, ioo I.C.C. 513 (1925); Consolidated Southwestern Cases, 123
I.C.C. 203 (1927); Western Trunk-Line Class Rates, 164 I.C.C. 1 (1930); Eastern Class Rate Investigation,
164 I.C.C. 314 (1930).
SD 123 I.C.C. 203, 398 (1927).
30 262 I.C.C. 447, 467 (1945).
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In 1942, as of August 3, there were 2o,916 sets of ratings in effect. Approximately
one-third of the carload ratings were uniform in the three classifications, but all the
rest of the carload ratings represented differences between territories, and almost onefourth of all the carload ratings were unlike in any two of the classifications.
The ratings are subject to numerous other substantial variations, inconsistencies,
and disparities. The great bulk of the items are concentrated in a comparatively few
classes, and some classes contain no items at all, or only one, two, or three items.
The range of the variations is wide. For example, in carload ratings, on items rated
class 35 in official territory, the ratings in southern and western territories range from
class 17 to 55; on items rated class 40 in southern, the ratings in official range from
class 27 to 7o , and in western, from class 17Yz to 40; and on items rated class 45 in
western, the ratings in official range from class 27 to 85, and in southern, from class
30 to 55.

There is no consistency in the assignment of ratings on the same article as between less-than-carload lots and carloads. On a given item, one classification will
provide the same rating for less-carloads as for carloads, but in other classifications
the ratings for carloads will be lower (or perhaps higher) than for less-carloads.
Although less-carload and carload ratings are the same on many items, on the great
majority of them the former are higher than the latter and extremely wide spreads
often occur, with less-carload ratings ranging up to 471 per cent of carload ratings.
Frequently these differences show up much more in the rates than in the ratings,
because even when the ratings are the same in all three territories the rates are subject to the differing rate levels.
Of course, the real problem which results from different territorial classifications
lies in the making of interterritorial rates, where different classification ratings compound the difficulty caused by different rate levels. Not only are the rate levels
different and the articles assigned to different classes; the classes frequently have different identification symbols, or the same identification symbol represents classes
having different percentage relationships to first class or to other classes. Sometimes
a direct route goes through all three classification territories. thus, different rates
exist in opposite directions between the same points, and over the same routes, on
classes that do not bear like percentage relations to the corresponding first-class rates
between the territories concerned. There is no way, except through classification and
class-rate uniformity, to relieve this situation, because an attempt to do it by changing

the classification of a particular article for the purpose of an interterritorial movement
distorts the rates as the distance in one of the territories increases and the distance
in the other territory, which has a different rate level, decreases. 3 '
The Commission concluded that there was no reason, of any validity, for the
sixty-year delay in bringing about classification uniformity. The Commission conicluded that necessary specific adjustments in rates could always be made by adjusting rate levels or by making exceptions to the classification, and that there was never
"State of Alabama v. New York Central R.R., 235 I.C.C. 255 (1939), 237 I.C.C. 515 (1940).
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any necessity for having different classification ratings for the same article. The
Commission pointed out that if the same classification rating can apply in a single
area including regions as dissimilar as Maine and southern Illinois in official territory, or Florida and Kentucky in southern territory, there is no reason why the same
classification cannot apply throughout the United States. The Commission gave the
railroads the opportunity to take the initiative in preparing a new uniform classification, and they have indicated that they will do so, although unfortunately no time
limit was set. This commitment of the railroads does not, of course, make classifications less important in the case now before the Supreme Court. The classification
findings of the Commission are still important, both because of the interdependence
of classifications and class rates and because the classification findings as well as the
class-rate findings are embodied in the Commission's single report, which is under
attack in its entirety and which seems indivisible.
B. Class-Rate Structures
As explained above, neither the classification alone nor the class rate alone determines the cost of shipment, and classification uniformity within territories has
gone hand in hand with class-rate uniformity within territories in the Commission's
regional proceedings. The territorial class-rate structures are at least as far out of
line with one another as the territorial classifications.
The railroad freight-rate structure of the United States has developed on a localized basis like a patchwork quilt, with each locality or railroad starting with a different level and scheme of rates. The localities and railroads have grown and merged
into fewer levels and schemes, until the present territorial boundaries were finally
reached. But the crossing of these boundaries to achieve national uniformity had to
wait until 1947; before the Class Rate Investigation was started in 1939 the Commission had made no attempt to harmonize or relate the regional rate structures.
There are, of course, five rate territories, compared with three classification territories, and these five rate territories are further divided into various zones and subterritories with different schemes of rates. In the Eastern Class Rate Investigation the
Commission noted that rates in the three traditional subdivisions of official territory
"have grown up independently of each other and, for the most part, with little comrates "difficult to describe because they
mon resemblance," with some of their class
32
are not based upon any definite principle."
In the South, the class-rate structure prior to i928 was a hodgepodge of rates
built around the old basing-point system, and the Commission in describing the rate
structure of southern territory prior to the southern revision said that "great inconsistencies prevail."3 3 The rates in the West had likewise evolved piecemeal and had
4
been the subject of complaints by every state regulatory commission in the territory?
The Commission in the regional proceedings did set up uniform scales of class
2 x64 I.C.C. at 323, 332 (1930).

o0 I.C.C. at 532 (1925).
"' Western Trunk Line Class Rates, 164 I.C.C. 1, 26-36 (930).

" Southern Class Rate Investigation,

558

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

rates for each region, but provided special different treatment for the sub-regions and
for particular situations. Key-point rates were provided to supplant class rates in
parts of each territory, but the key-point rate systems of the territories, like the classrate systems, were not consistent or similarly extensive within the separate territories.
In the border areas between territories efforts were made, through special rate adjustments, to soften the sharp breaks at the borders between the territorial rate levels.35
In the West, four separate zones were set up, with an elaborate laminated formula for
adding zone differentials layer on layer in making rates between zones30
The interterritorial class rates (as distinguished from the intraterritorial class rates
described above) were far more complicated, even after the regional revisions, and are
still unsuitable to move traffic in a national flow. It is only necessary to study the
K-2-Q-I rate scheme applicable between southern territory and the western part of
official territory,7 or the complexities of the interterritorial rate adjustment covering
the border area on both sides of the boundary between official and southern territories,38 to discover how unnecessarily complex and difficult the interterritorial rate
situation has been made by the fact that each territory has its separate classification
and class-rate structure. If any further persuasion is necessary, it is suggested that
the complications caused by the Mississippi River boundary between the West and
the other territories be examinedV9
IV
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION

The proceedings before the Commission in the Class Rate case were characterized
by the usual informality, in comparison with a court of law, as far as rules of evidence and latitude in method and scope of presentation are concerned. As a result,
a substantial part of the record is made up of statements by various shipping and
other interests of their positions and views, which were not in all cases supported by
detailed or relevant factual data. However, the i7,Ooo-page record does have detailed
factual evidence covering almost every kind of rate situation, and the Commission
itself caused to be prepared and received in evidence elaborate technical studies,
perhaps the most important of which were the cost, traffic, and economic studies.
The original report of the Commission is over i6oooo words long, and is highly
technical and rather discursive. However, the major findings and conclusions can
be reduced to six main propositions, which will be analyzed separately below.
Whether these six major findings were supported by adequate evidence and preliminary findings is the most important issue in the case before the Supreme Court. In
31 See, for example, North Carolina Corporation Comm'n v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 213
(r935).
" Western Trunk Line Class Rates, x64 I.C.C. I (r930), 204 I.c.c. 595 (1934).

IC.C.

259

"r Southern Class Rate Investigation, 1oo I.C.C. 513, 532 (1925).
s North Carolina Corporation Comm'n v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 213 I.C.C. 259 (1935); Commonwealth
of Kentucky v. Almapee & W. Ry., 2r3 I.C.C. 297 (1935).
9 Western Trunk Line Class Rates, 164 I.C.C. X (1930); Western-Southern Class Rates, 226 I.C.C.

497 (1938); Consolidated Southwestern Cases, 2ist Supplemental Report, 205 I.C.C. 6ox (X934).
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a sense it is the only real issue in connection with the 194o legislation, because, as
noted above, the difference between the parties is really not whether Congress gave
the Commission a mandate to equalize rates regardless of territorial transportation
conditions, but is rather whether, or the extent to which, territorial transportation
conditions are sufficiently different to warrant the existing territorial rate differentials.
I. Class rates within southern and western territories, and from these territories
to official territory,are much higher, article for article, than the rates within official
territory.
The Commission first considered the territorial rate levels as distinguished from
specific situations involving competitive rate inequalities. It concluded that the firstclass rate scale for southern territory was 37.7 per cent higher than the official territory first-class rate scale, and that the three rate territories in the West had first-class
rate scales higher than the official scale by 46, 6i, and 71 per cent, respectively. These
are the figures for intraterritorialmovements.
Because interterritorialmovements can be figured only in terms of specific places
(the actual rate depending upon how much of the movement is in each territory),
abstract comparisons of interterritorial rate levels with intraterritorial rate levels
cannot be made. The Commission found that a Nashville shipper would pay 39
cents more on each hundred pounds of first-class freight moving to Indianapolis,
Indiana, than a shipper to Indianapolis from Kent, Ohio (the distance being practically the same)-a disadvantage of 41 per cent. Thousands of such examples were
offered in evidence.
Comparisons such as this are, of course, theoretical, and based on the published
rate scales and tariffs, without regard to actual shipments. Having considered these
discriminatory rate levels, the Commission went on to consider the testimony of
shippers who were discriminated against, and to hear about their actual experiences
of competitive disadvantages caused by the discriminatory rates, of which the following incidents are illustrative:
Atlanta, Georgia, is a large producer of machinery-wiping rags, which were in
heavy demand in official territory in carload lots during the war, but the Atlanta
shipper competing in official territory with official-territory shippers was obliged to
pay rates 8o per cent higher than the official-territory level. The Atlaita producers
were consistently unsuccessful in bidding for business in official territory, solely because of this freight-rate discrimination.
An extreme case was that of a manufacturer of automobile truck bodies at Nashville, Tennessee, who labored under a rate handicap as high as 253 per cent of the
rates available to his competitor at Detroit, Michigan, when both manufacturers were
shipping to Metuchen, New Jersey, which is 965 miles from Nashville and 616 miles
from Detroit. The Nashville shipper was paying $2.io per hundred pounds, and
the Detroit shipper from 53 cents to $1.O3.
A large iron and steel company in Pueblo, Colorado, was able to reach eastward
only as far as 700 miles, compared with its distribution in all other directions of
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i,ooo to i,6oo miles. The controlling factor in preventing more extensive distribution
in the East was the class-rate structure, which permitted Pittsburgh to ship 5o per
cent farther for the same charge than Pueblo. For example, Pueblo was paying
$i.o5 to ship steel shell castings 6oi miles to Omaha, Nebraska, whereas Pittsburgh
was shipping to Omaha, 922 miles away, for only 99 cents.
2. Higher class rates have impeded the development and movement of class-rate
traffic within southern and western territories, and from these territoriesto official
territory,and thus have made all the class-ratestructures obsolete.
a. Impeding the development of class-rate traffic--economic data. The Com-

mission, having found class rates higher in the South and West, and having found
that these discriminations were injuring individual shippers, properly considered
that in investigating territorial discrimination, it should inquire further into economic
disadvantages of the South and West on a territorial basis, because territorial discrimination would seem to mean something broader than discrimination against
individual shippers located in a territory. If the territorial rate levels in the South
and West were substantially higher than the official-territory level, and if the industrial development of the South and West had been retarded, so that these regions
were at substantial economic disadvantages, it was a legitimate inference that there
existed at least some cause and effect relationship between these two facts. Elaborate
economic data were introduced in evidence by the Commission's experts and by
others, on the basis both of logic and precedent.40
The evidence showed that in 1939 official territory produced 67.8 per cent of all
the manufactured products in the United States, by value, and 71.4 per cent of the
total value added by manufacture. The average dollar income per person employed
in 1940 in official territory was $1,988, compared with $940 in southern territory and
$1,177 in southwestern territory.

The South and West furnish raw materials to official territory, which adds intensively to their values by making finished products, which it then ships back to
the South and West. This dominant mercantile position is achieved largely through
the imposition of larger rate discriminations on manufactured goods than on raw
materials. For example, on cottonseed oil the rate from southern to official territory
is only 7 per cent higher than the official-territory rate, but the rate on cottonseed
oil manufactured into oleomargarine is 35 per cent higher. A striking illustration
of the way in which the rates have discouraged manufacturing in the South and
West is afforded by the fact that the average ton of outbound freight from official
territory represents value added by manufacture of $54.69, which is about thirteen
times as great as the $4.19 value added by manufacture to the average ton outbound
from the South and West.
The South and West are largely dependent on official territory for new manufacturing industries, because a substantial portion of the purchasing power of the United
States is in official territory, which has approximately half of the population of the
"o
Texas &P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. x97, at 2X9 (x896).
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United States, 64 per cent of the national market for all goods and services, and 76
per cent of the market for industrial machinery and raw materials.
The Commission concluded that piecemeal adjustment of class rates could never
adequately meet the problem of the lack of development of class-rate traffic from
the South and West, because individual adjustments do not and cannot take into
account traffic which does not already exist. The Commission concluded that class
rates presently discriminate against the southern and western industries that use and
pay them; they also discriminate against the industries in existence which would
use them if they were not so high; but they go even farther, and discriminate
against industries that are still unborn and that cannot be born until fair class rates
precede them into existence.
b. Non-use or obsolescence of class rates. The Commission found that the class
rates have, by reason of nonuse, become obsolete, and that they "do not now serve
the purposes for which they were designed."41
In the Southern Class Rate Investigation the Commission said:
The new class rates should look also to the future. They should, for example, be so
framed as to facilitate the elimination not only of special classification exceptions but also
of many commodity rates which provoke complaints of discrimination and have no other
42
excuse than an inadequate and imperfect class-rate structure.

A waybill study was introduced in evidence showing on a sample basis how much
carload traffic moved on class rates in 1942. It showed that in official territory 5.8
per cent of the carload traffic moved on class rates, but that only 1.8 per cent of
such traffic moved on class rates within southern territory, 2.4 per cent within southwestern territory, and o.6 per cent in western trunk-line territory. All the rest of
the traffic in these territories moved on exception or commodity rates. The evidence
showed wholesale removals of commodities from the classifications, over three thousand commodities having been removed from the southern classification at one time
in September, 1940.
The class rates are the pattern and heart of any rate structure. The Commission
concluded that if the class rates in the South and West were so high that exception
rates and commodity rates could, in the short space of time since the regional classrate revisions, supersede them almost completely, there was something fundamentally
wrong with these class-rate structures. When class rates become obsolete, the hodgepodge that emerges, made up almost entirely of ad hoc rate adjustments, cannot
accurately be called a coherent rate structure. The conversion by the carriers of
class rates into paper rates, after the extensive labors of the Commission in setting
up the regional class-rate structures, proves that the regional class rates have become
obsolete, largely by virtue of their maladjustment, region by region, with each other.
The' Commission concluded that this excessive use of ad hoc rates had broken down
the soundness of the rate structures, and made the class rates so obsolescent or obso" Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I.C.C. 699 (1945).
42 XOO I.C.C. 513, 603 (1925). See also Consolidated Southwestern Cases, 123 I.C.C, 203, 234 (1927).
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lete that they required revision, because they would not and could not move the
traffic which they were designed to move, and because each rate structure had almost
completely broken away from what was intended to be its pattern and cornerstone.
3. Comparative costs of transportationservice do not justify the existing classrate differentials.
The most important factor in comparing territorial transportation conditions is
cost of service, because practically all other factors, such as density of traffic, terminal
operations, terrain, etc., are merged in the cost figures. The Commission relied
heavily on the cost study introduced in evidence by one of its experts, Dr. Ford K.
Edwards, which has been called the most comprehensive study of transportation
costs ever made. Space limitations prevent any detailed explanation of this cost
evidence, but the procedure followed was to relate every expense of every railroad
in each territory to the particular units of service with which each item of expense
was found to be directly variable (such as gross ton-miles, car miles, car days, etc.),
and then, knowing the number of each unit furnished in each territory, to construct
cost scales for every possible significant variation of equipment, loading, etc. From
the cost scales it was then possible to determine costs in each territory of representative identical loads and hauls, and of actual loads, hauls, and traffic consists. Almost
every possible kind of territorial comparison was made, using both direct or variable
costs and fully distributed costs, including allowances for return, with the result
that the Commission concluded that no substantial difference could be found to exist
between the territories in transportation costs, costs in the South being slightly below
those in official territory, and costs in the West being, in general, slightly higher.
The Commission therefore found that existing territorial rate differentials are not
justified by territorial cost differentials. Rates of return in the South and West were
found by the Commission to be more favorable than in official territory, and this
was stated to be an additional reason for the conclusion that the rate differentials
were not justified.
4. Differing consists and volumes of traffic within the territoriesare no justification for the class-ratediffientials.
Although there is more class-rate traffic in official territory than in other territories,
and although many commodities move in larger volume in one territory than in
another, the Commission found that there were not sufficient differences in consists
for revenue purposes to justify the class-rate differentials.
In the first place, all interterritorial traffic is common to two or more territories.
In the second place, the high-paying traffic, embraced mainly in the Commission's
grouping called "Manufactures and Miscellaneous," accounts for 27 to 29 per cent
of the total tons carried in each of the three territories-a small spread. The corresponding revenue percentages differ by similarly small margins. The three remaining principal groups of products, which can broadly be characterized as traffic moving
at relatively low rates and in substantial volume, likewise have a narrow spread as
between territories, of under 4 per cent at the extremes, in both total tons carried
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and revenues, so that when considered by groups the consists of the territories do
not differ very much.
On the question whether there should be rate differences because a particular
commodity moves in great volume in one territory and in small volume or not at
all in another territory, the answer is that territorial volume means nothing to the
individual shipper, and nothing to the carrier except from the standpoint of costs,
which, territory by territory, were found not to differ substantially. The real question is not whether the commodities moving in the several territories are different,
but whether they have different rate-bearing characteristics. The fact that some particular commodity moves regularly in substantial quantity in one territory-like
phosphate rock in the South, which moves only in small quantities in the other
territories-means nothing if comparisons of total revenues and rates of return show
that other commodities must be moving in the other territories with equal revenueproducing effects.
5. Equalizing the class rates of the territories is not dependent on equalizing
other rates.
Appellants in the Class Rate case claimed that the exception and commodity rates
in the South and West were lower for the same freight than the official territory
rates, and that the Commission could not properly raise class rates in official territory
and lower them in other territories without, at the same time, bringing about
some kind of equalization of exception and commodity rates, which move the great
bulk of the traffic in all territories. The Commission's answer to this point was
twofold: There was no proof that the territorial commodity and exception rate levels
in the South and West were lower; and, second, the Commission could not revise
every rate in the United States in one proceeding, and had a right to proceed step
by step, with the class rates, which are the pattern for all rates, as the necessary and
logical first step. Of a similar situation, where the Commission had undertaken,
step by step, to correct a type of discrimination found illegal, the Supreme Court
had said, in United States v. Wabash Railroad Company:
... The suppression of abuses resulting from violations of §6(7) would be rendered practically impossible if the Commission were required to suppress all simultaneously or none.
Section 12(1) imposes on the Commission the duty to enforce the provisions of the Act.
That duty under §6(7) would hardly be performed if the Commission were to decline
4
to enforce it against one because it could not at the same time enforce it against all. 3

6. Interterritorialrate problems are insoluble without uniformity in class ratings
and rates.
On a physical basis, the railroads of the United States have developed into a
national system. Carloads of freight loaded at any point can be delivered to any
other point where standard-gauge 'railroads exist without unloading and reloading
en route. However, the uniformity that characterizes this mechanical service does
not extend to freight rates, the price of the service. Consequently, there exists a
le32I U. S. 403, 414 (I944).
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composite of regional rate structures that do not and cannot be made to fit together

properly, because of pronounced differences in both the level and scheme of the
rates. This regionalism restricts commerce and trade by hampering a national flow
of traffic across these territorial boundary lines, thus retarding economic progress.
As stated by the late Joseph B. Eastman, in his first report to Congress as Federal
Coordinator of Transportation:
...
An objectionable phase of the railroad situation for many years has been the maintenance of regional differences and distinctions, which are very imperfectly related to
differences in costs and of territorial boundary lines ("Chinese walls") where rate systems
and practices change. It has tended to provincialize the railroads and discourage national
unity of action. It has been a prolific source of complaints to the Commission."

The malignant effects of territorial rate discriminations were noted by the Supreme
Court in Georgia v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company:
... Discriminatory rates are but one form of trade barriers. They may cause a blight no
less serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in the
streams. They may affect the prosperity and welfare of a State as profoundly as any
diversion of waters from the rivers. They may stifle, impede, or cripple old industries
and prevent the establishment of new ones. They may arrest the development of a State
or put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets.4

V
THE ATTACK ON

THE COMMISSION'S DEcISION

A. Procedure
The Urgent Deficiencies Act of I91346 gives the district courts of the United States
original jurisdiction of cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole
or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The venue of such
suits is governed by section 43,4 7 and procedure by sections 44_48,4s which provide,
among other things, that such suits shall be brought against the United States, with
intervention by the Interstate Commerce Commission a matter of right. The jurisdiction of the District Court for the Northern District of New York in the Class
Rate case rested on these provisions. The interlocutory injunction of the District
Court was issued under section 47. After the court entered its final decree, the plain-

tiffs below took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, as provided for in section 47a.
B. Scope of Review
The scope of review by a district court and by the Supreme Court of orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, when such orders are attacked under the
procedure used in the Class Rate case, is narrow and closely circumscribed under the

Supreme Court's decisions.
"'SEN. Do=. No. I19, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 29 (1934).

1 324 U. S. 439, 450 (i944).

in 38

STAT. 2r9 (1913), 28 U. S. C. §31 (1940).
38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. §43 (1940).
4S 3 8 STAT. 220 (93), 28 U. S. C. §§44-48 (1940).
7
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The doctrine of administrative finality49 is especially applicable to rate cases, the
technical complexity of which prohibits judicial inquiry on the merits:
The process of rate making is essentially empiric. The stuff of the process is fluid
and changing-the resultant of factors that must be valued as well as weighed. Congress
has therefore delegated the enforcement of transportation policy to a permanent expert
body and has charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dynamic character of
transportation problems. Cf. Railroad Commission v.Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 3o
U. S. 573, 581-8z.
The wisdom of the narrow scope within which Congress has confined judicial participation in the rate-making process is strikingly vindicated by the history of this controversy.... There was no ready answer either in law reports or in economic experience.
Any solution had to rest on informed judgment. And judgment in a situation like this
implies, ultimately, prophecy based on the facts in the record as illumined by the seasoned
wisdom of the expert body. In this perspective, the Commission had several choices before
it-but all inevitably rested upon trial and error.... Of only one thing could the Commission be completely certain: no action could be taken without "adversely affecting
certain of the conflicting interests." 164 I.C.C. 619, 698.... That the Commission itself
was of divided mind in the successive stages of this controversy emphasizes that the
problem is enmeshed in difficult judgments of economic and transportation policy. Neither
rule of thumb, nor formula, nor general principles provide a ready answer. We certainly
have neither technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of
the course taken by the Commission. It is not for us to tinker with so sensitive an organism as the grain rate structure, only a minor phase of which is caught in the record before
us. If we were to grant the relief sought by the appellants, we would be restoring evils
which the exclusive rate-break adjustment was designed to remove-evils which, for all
we know, would be far more serious than those complained of by the appellants.50
Some economic problems are so difficult of solution that it is unfortunate that they
have to be decided at all. However, when they are presented some solution must
be found, even though it may not be, and may not purport to be, the only possible
solution; and where a rate problem of this kind is presented, Congress and the
Supreme Court have left no doubt that it is the Commission, and not the courts,
which must make the decision and have the last say under the doctrine of administrative finality, subject only to those few well-defined and closely restricted lines of
inquiry which the reviewing court may take:
...the

Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact that it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of validity.
And he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making
a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602.
The Commission considered that it had, and we find no reason to doubt that it had, the
evidence before it that was needful to the discharge of its duty to the public and to the
regulated railroad. "With that sort of evidence before them, rate experts of acknowledged
ability and fairness, and each acting independently of the other, may not have reached
identically the same conclusions. We do not know whether the results would have been
approximately the same. For there is no possibility of solving the question as though it
" Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 ('939).

50 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 3X4 U. S. 534, 546-548 (1942).
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were a mathematical problem to which there could only be one correct answer. Still there
was in this mass of facts that out of which experts could have named a rate. The law
makes the Commission's finding on such facts conclusive." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union PacificR. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 550.51
C. Other Legal Questions
It has already been pointed out that the two principal legal issues in the Class
Rate case were the illusory issue of the effect of the Transportation Act of 194o, and
particularly the amendment to section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, on the
power of the Commission to remove territorial discriminations, and the further central issue of whether the report and order of the Commission were supported by
adequate evidence and had a rational basis, ie., the issue of arbitrariness. There were,
however, other legal questions which will be briefly touched upon below.
i. Common source of discriminationand alternativeremedy-the Texas & Pacific
case.
The appellants, largely on the basis of Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States, contended that the Commission erred in not giving the carriers a choice between alternative methods of removing the rate discriminations, and they maintained,
further, that the Commission had no power to order discriminations removed because
different carriers were involved in the two sets of rates. These contentions are based
on the following language from the Texas & Pacific case:
A carrier or group of carriers must be the common source of the discrimination, must
effectively participate in both rates, if an order for the correction of the disparity is to run
against it or them. Where an order is made under §3 an alternative must be afforded.
may abate the discrimination by raising one rate, lowering the
The offender or offenders
52
other, or altering both.
The answer to the alternative remedy point is that the order in the Class Rate
case was not made under section 353 but under section i5(I) u4 of the Act. Mr.
Justice Roberts pointed out, both in the Texas & Pacific case and in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Company v. United States,5 that the alternative remedy doctrine does
not apply to orders under section 15().
To the contention that the same carriers must control both sets of rates, the answer
is that the only rate relationship found by the Commission to be discriminatory was
the relationship between the class rates from other territories into official territory on
the one hand, and the rates within official territory on the other hand, both sets of
which are controlled by the official-territory carriers, which make the latter rates
and jointly control the former (interterritorial) rates. It is well settled that it is not
necessary that a carrier's rails reach the point subjected to prejudice for it to be
guilty of violating section 3(I). 56
rlInterstate Commerce Commission v. City of Jersey City,

322 U.
52 289 U. S. 627, 650 (1933).
5324 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §3 (1940).
64 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §15(1) (1940).
a 295 U. S. 476 (1935).

"St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. United States,
United States, 270 U. S. 287 (X926).

245

S.

503, 512-513

(1944).

U. S. 136, at 144 (1917); Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. v.
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Finally, serious doubts are cast on the validity of the reasoning in the Texas &
Pacific case by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone, concurred in by Chief
Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Cordozo, in which sharp issue
is taken with the majority on the issues of the necessity of alternative remedies and
a common source of discrimination. After pointing out the fallacies in the majority
opinion, the minority reached the conclusion that the situation in the Texas & Pacific
case was identical with that in the St. Louis Southwestern case.5 7
Of course, all of the cases referred to above were decided before the 194o amendment of section 3(I). The effect of that amendment on the question whether there
can be a discrimination between territories, not involving the same groups of carriers, which the Commission is, by the amendment, given power to correct, even
though neither carrier is by itself guilty of an unlawful discrimination, has not been
before the Supreme Court, and is not before the Court in the Class Rate case. There
is, however, a strong argument in favor of the existence of such power. The different
rate territories, almost by definition, contain separate groups of carriers. If a Missouri
shipper, competing in the Twin Cities with an Illinois shipper, must pay freight on
the western scale in order to go up the west bank of the Mississippi River to Minneapolis, and suffer a 50 per cent higher freight rate than his competitor across the
Mississippi River, who, using another carrier, is shipping on the official rate basis to
St. Paul, and the Commission is powerless to correct this discrimination, there is still a
serious void in the Commission's power, which was not corrected in 194o by the addition of the word "territory" to section 3(i) of the Act. Even before 1940, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & PacificRailway Company,
said that the Commission under section 15 "may conduct a comprehensive inquiry
into the rates of all the lines within the area in controversy, may fix the fair relation
between one line and another, and may build the structure of the rates accordingly." 'S
If the power of the Commission is so narrow that it is precluded from protecting
shippers against discrimination unless both rates involved in the rate relationship
are controlled by the same carriers, the Commission will find that it is unable to
build a rate structure from which discrimination between territories can fairly be
said to be absent. Surely, this was not the intention of Congress in I94o.
2. Preliminaryfindings.
The appellants insisted that the Commission had failed to make a number of
preliminary findings which they said were essential to support the ultimate findings.
There was no unanimity among the appellants about the particular findings claimed
to be necessary. The Government contended that a short answer to these contentions
was that none of the findings asserted to be necessary was jurisdictional, and "the
Commission is not compelled to annotate to each finding the evidence supporting
it."60
ST245 U. S. 136 (1917).
S294 U. S. 499, 509 (1935).
' See the discussion of the Transportation Act of 1940,
60 United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327

supra.
U. S. 515 (1946).

568

LAw AND CONEMPORAtY PROBLEMS

The principal preliminary finding which the appellants insisted was essential was
a finding that the rates in official territory were non-compensatory. Such a finding,
it was argued, was prerequisite to the order that these rates be raised Io per cent.
However, where rates are discriminatory their compensatory character is not the
decisive factor.6 ' Further, the rates in official territory were found by the Commission to be unreasonably low, in violation of section I of the Act, and such a finding
may be proper even though the rates found unreasonable have been specifically found
2
to be compensatory.
3. Confiscation.
The western railroads, in their separate suit and by their intervention in the original action, alleged that the new less-carload rates in the West were shown to be confiscatory on the face of the Commission's report, because of the Commission's finding
that the western less-carload rates, which the Commission ordered reduced by lo
per cent, resulted in 1939 in a deficit to the railroads of over thirty-four million
dollars. In support of this allegation the western roads, over the objection of the
Government,0 3 introduced additional testimony in the district court. The infirmities in this confiscation evidence, which the district court found not sufficiently
convincing, 4 are too technical to permit discussion in the space available here, but
it might be pointed out that less-carload freight accounts for only a very small percentage of total railroad freight tonnage (1.3 per cent in 1944);"' unlike carload
freight, the carriers load it, handle it, and unload it, and it is within their power to
make this service expensive to themselves (for example, by light loading of cars)
or to keep their costs down to a minimum (for example, by full loading of cars). If
rates should be made with the idea of compensating carriers for the most expensive
way of handling less-carload traffic, the inevitable result would be to reward inefficiency and to penalize shippers unnecessarily.
The Commission was trying to prescribe a rate structure to eliminate the complicated and chaotic hodgepodge that had grown up in the several rate territories.
Isolated differences in costs are bound to exist between railroads and between particular segments of traffic. Although governmental authority cannot single out a
particular segment of traffic and require railroads to carry it below cost,"' no rate
structure can make every shipment on every mile of every particular road move at a
profit. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out in the Northern Pacific case, "the ratemaking power may be exercised in a practical way and . . . the legislature is not
bound to assure a net profit from 'every mile, section, or other part into which the
road may be divided.' ,0 The district court agreed with the Government that if a
11Interstate Commerce Commission v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U. S. 67! (1943).
6 Scandrett v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 995 (1940), aff'd, 312 U. S. 661 (1941).
Island Salt Mining Co. v. United States, 6 F. 2d 315 (1925).
See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938).
' 65 F. Supp. 856, 869 (1946).
"INTERSTATE

See also Jefferson
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:'Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585 (1915).
7
" id. at 6oo.

1944 (1946).
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small fraction of the less-carload traffic might result in loss, this was an incidental
and not a deliberate result, in a "mere detail' of a national rate structure, for which
it would be improper to set aside the entire rate structure.
V
CONCLUSION

The district court upheld the contentions of the Government all along the line.6 s
The district court adopted all of the Commission's findings of fact. While the
interim order of the Commission did not bring about absolute equalization of class
rates, and did not effect immediate classification uniformity, but only ordered the
southern and western rates reduced io per cent and the official rates raised io per
cent, thus leaving these rates about io per cent apart, the interim order was premised
on the necessity of complete equalization and uniformity, which was delayed only to
await the completion of the uniform classification. Thus the upholding of the Commission's order would place final approval on the result toward which the Commission is working-absolute classification and class-rate uniformity so long as differences
in territorial transportation conditions are not substantial enough to warrant territorial differences in class rates.
The power of the Commission to correct all interterritorial freight rate discriminations thus seems clear, and no further legislation to that end appears either necessary or desirable. Certainly it would be unwise for Congress to require freight rate
uniformity regardless of substantially differing transportation conditions in the
territories.
There is only one qualification to this conclusion. It was suggested above that
the Commission and the courts have not yet undertaken to pass on the issue of
whether a discrimination can be corrected between intraterritorial rates of one territory and intraterritorial rates of another territory. However, for reasons stated above,
it is believed that such power exists, and that the Commission could have gone
farther than it did in its findings as to discrimination and its order in the Class Rate
case.
This conclusion concerning the adequate power of the Commission is necessarily
divorced from any opinion as to the ability of the Commission to combat railroad
conspiracies which may violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Commission has
all the power it needs to remove all interterritorial freight rate discriminations, and
whether these discriminations stem from conspiracies, individual pressures, lack of
information about transportation conditions, or inertia is irrelevant to the question
of the power of the Commission to remove them. The Commission in the Class
Rate case has already shown its disposition to remove these discriminations, and the
question of conspiracy or monopoly as the source of the discrimination was not and
could not properly have been considered by the Commission in making its inquiry
" 65 F. Supp. 856 (1946).

570

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

and determination. The Commission has no jurisdiction to act on antitrust conspiracies as such. The courts have no jurisdiction to make new rates to eliminate
the effects of antitrust conspiracies. The power of the Commission and the power
of the courts in connection with interterritorial freight rate discriminations are therefore wholly separate and unrelated powers. The power of the Commission is the
power to correct rates; the power of the courts is the power to enjoin or punish
conspiracies.

